Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters by Burnell, Peter J.
  
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Peter J. Burnell 
Article Title: Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters 
Year of publication: 2006 
Link to published version: http;//dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436590600720710 
Publisher statement: None 
 
 
 
 1
Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy Matters 
 
PETER BURNELL♣
 
ABSTRACT As recent experiments in democratization around the world show signs 
of achieving success, or failure, or more usually something in between, the attention 
of democracy promotion actors in the international community is turning to the 
world’s remaining outstanding autocracies.  The article identifies the autocracies, 
discusses the notion of autocratic opening, and explores how opening can come 
about, with particular reference to international intervention.  The article argues that 
for identifying the prospects for autocratic opening and determining the forms of 
constructive engagement available to international actors  it is useful to distinguish 
between the different grounds on which various autocracies claim legitimacy, and the 
specific vulnerabilities to which their principal legitimating base gives rise. 
 
‘Even within democratic governments, NGOs in the democracies, and academia, there has been 
relatively little reflection on the process of ousting dictators and the need for plans and action’ .1
 
Introduction 
 
‘Autocracies’ and autocratic rule are words that have wide currency in debates about 
the progress of democratising trends around the world, delineating a particular 
category of political regime that is widely thought to be in retreat. The ‘third wave’ of 
democracy in the 1980s and the early 1990s and a more recent groundswell of 
political change displayed by the ‘rose’, ‘orange’ and ‘cedar’ revolutions in Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Lebanon have all contributed to this impression.  As more countries 
move some way along the pathways of political liberalisation and democratisation so 
the attention of democracy promotion actors in the international community, who 
have proliferated and expanded their activities in the last two decades or so, now 
begins to turn to the group of outstanding cases, the ‘non-transitions’.  This is 
illustrated nowhere more vividly than in Ambassador Palmer’s book, Breaking the 
Real Axis of Evil. How to Oust the World’s Last Dictators by 2025, published in 2003. 
                                                 
♣ Peter Burnell is a Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and International Studies, 
University of Warwick, England. Email: peter.burnell@warwick.ac.uk 
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However, just as the very mixed record of democratization among those 
countries that have embarked on political change confirms the complexity of the 
challenge, so it underscores the realisation that there is no inevitability about 
successful autocratic opening to democracy.  Understanding how autocratic opening 
might be brought about seems at one and the same time to be both more pressing and 
more difficult. This paper argues that the different sources of domestic legitimacy 
autocracies may enjoy and the different vulnerabilities these can give rise to, deserve 
more thought than the attention they have hitherto received, not least for the 
implications for constructive engagement by democracy promotion actors in the 
international community. 
 
Distinguishing the autocracies 
 
As a political concept ‘autocracy’ is actually rather poorly defined. The Oxford 
English Dictionary calls it ‘absolute government by one person’, which is much 
narrower than the rather loose way ‘autocracies’ have come to be cited in 
contemporary political debate. Moreover even individual despots rule by virtue of the 
acquiescence and connivance of others: at minimum they need the support of the 
praetorian guard, as the philosopher David Hume writing in the eighteenth century 
observed.  Autocrats might claim there are no formal constraints on their authority, 
but de facto power is never unlimited, especially in today’s increasingly 
interdependent world where increasing amounts of polycentric or multi-level 
governance encroach on state power and national sovereignty.  Furthermore, not only 
do definitions that emphasise individual rulers distract attention from the autocracies’ 
system of rule, but they fail to recognise important differences over claims about the 
right to rule on the one side and on the other side cases where no such right at all is 
claimed - that is, where the autocrats’ power enjoys no legitimacy at all, and rests 
solely on force and fear. 
 The many references to autocracies in current discourse betray no single or 
‘true’ meaning, although there is a purely etymological account that can be traced 
back to the ancient Greek philosophers. That said, autocracies can be understood as 
political regimes where competitive political participation is sharply restricted or 
suppressed and the power-holders reserve a right to determine the rights and freedoms 
everyone else enjoys, while being largely free from institutional constraints 
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themselves.2  In a fundamental sense such claims to arbitrary or unlimited power 
mean the ruled must be unfree, even if in practice the people are permitted some 
liberties  to a certain degree, for example some economic freedoms, at the autocrat’s 
discretion. Situating ‘autocracy’ towards the ‘hard’ end of the scale of authoritarian 
rule not only captures much general usage of the term but, compared to the dictionary 
definition is less likely to be a fairly empty category in practice.  Of course some, 
perhaps arbitrary decision must draw the boundary with less hard types of 
authoritarianism; and the literature’s invention of terms for ‘diminished forms of 
autocracy’ such as ‘limited autocracy’, ‘semi-autocracy’, and ‘liberalised autocracy’ 
do complicate the picture. Nevertheless it should be possible to separate out the 
autocracies from both democracies and ‘diminished forms of democracy’ - the 
‘hybrid’ regimes that share some democratic with some authoritarian characteristics. 
To identify which states are the autocracies a pragmatic response would be to 
use the information supplied by Polity datasets, Freedom House scores and the like.  
For example the non-profit, Washington DC-based and in part US government-funded 
organisation  Freedom House, which regards international democracy promotion as its 
core business,  claims to measure freedom and its absence (not levels of democracy). 
However its  annual surveys, which employ a scale of 1 = most free to 7 = least free, 
are cited widely in the democratisation literature. The number of existing autocracies 
is sensitive to where we set the threshold level for autocracy. For example if it is a 
‘double six’ or higher (at minimum a score of 6 for civil liberties and 6 for political 
rights ) then Freedom House’s survey for 2004 would place 23 countries as 
autocracies. Lowering the threshold to capture all states that Freedom House itself 
styles ‘not free’ (a minimum score of 11 for rights and liberties combined) more than 
doubles the number of autocracies, to 49, which is not far short of the number of 
‘partly free’ states (54).3  Variations of this nature that owe to where we draw the line 
can impact on the common or distinctive patterns we then detect and that autocracies 
are found to share as a group. 
 
Variety of autocracies and domestic legitimacy 
 
The 49 states deemed ‘not free’ in 2004 comprised 21 in Africa including North 
Africa, 16 in Asia including Central Asia, eight in the Middle East, two in the 
Americas (Cuba; Haiti) and two in Europe (Belarus; Russia ).  These autocracies 
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exhibited considerable variety in many notable respects. Whether the true number 
should be 49 or just 23 or indeed is now close to 45 , the countries show much 
diversity in the following : demographic size; territorial size; geographical location; 
size of economy; average income per capita; recent economic performance (growth 
rate); socio-economic inequality; culture (including religion); military capability and 
general state strength or weakness (autocracies may all claim ‘despotic power’ - the 
power to control and suppress through coercive means - but they differ considerably 
in their ‘infrastructural power’, that is the power to penetrate and transform society, 
the capacity to promote modernisation and development4). They vary too in respect of 
the state’s patronage resources whether oil revenues-based or some other (this is 
relevant to the thesis that says demands for political representation/ governmental 
accountability are proportional to taxation), and in their record of addressing society’s 
material wants and other needs. They also vary with respect to how integrated they 
are into the global trading system and their openness to foreign private capital flows, 
their interaction with peoples from the established democracies through international 
communications, foreign travel and the like, and the state of diplomatic relations with 
other countries, especially the major powers, or ‘linkage’ more generally with the 
West. There is no equivalence among autocracies in their political clout (actual or 
potential) in regional and global forums and their ability to get what they want from 
the international system, with or without resort to coercion, threats or payments.5 The 
presence of China and its overall displacement in the group of autocracies makes the 
overall picture look more diverse in some major respects, but certain features that are 
generally found in autocracies (without being common to all) such as poverty and 
great inequality are not exclusive to autocracies. Moreover they do not necessarily 
preclude favourable scores for freedom and democracy: India, often called ‘the 
world’s largest democracy’ and rated free by Freedom House illustrates the point.   
In terms of the political system, most especially the route by which the chief 
executive is determined, it is conventional to distinguish between personalistic 
dictatorship, sometimes referred to as sultanism6 and absolute monarchs, which come 
closest to autocracy in the dictionary sense (best exemplified among the Gulf states), 
de jure one-party states and military or military-backed regimes.  These distinctions 
and their importance to the nature and prospects of transition to consolidated 
democracy are widely understood. However, no less significant is that autocracies 
differ also in regard to how much domestic legitimacy they enjoy – the regime’s 
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acceptance by significant sections of society as legitimate authority – and just as 
important, in the legitimising source of their authority - how they legitimate their rule.  
Many autocracies can -  do -  enjoy some measure of legitimacy among social groups 
or strata even while they may possess no legitimacy at all among other subjects, a fact 
that is conveniently overlooked by much present day talk of democracy as a ‘world 
value’  Such ethnocentric claims about the absolute appeal of democracy and 
reference to widespread recognition of the imperative to clothe claims to political 
authority in language reminiscent of democracy, however bogus or strained, should 
not lead us to ignore the alternatives that continue to bestow some stability on some 
autocratic regimes – however puzzling or unappealing most people in the established 
liberal democracies might find them. This is potentially significant to exploring 
pathways out of autocracy and deliberating the role that democracy promotion actors 
in the international community might play. 
The differences in sources of legitimacy are not synonymous with the types of 
political system or in the manner of executive recruitment although in certain cases 
there is a close fit. The sources include the distinctive claims based around the 
claimed right to hereditary rule (the source of legitimacy claimed by the largest 
number of historical autocracies) and theocratic rule - legitimacy based on status as 
clerics - where Iran and Saudi Arabia currently come closest; others rest on religious 
credentials of a formally looser or weaker nature. Then there are the claims to 
legitimacy grounded in a specific political ideology, most notably communism or 
ethnic nationalism or some mixture of the two usually effected by the persuasive 
practical powers of state propaganda. This may or may not be linked to the 
architecture of political inclusiveness indicated by a ‘participatory’ one-party regime. 
‘Electoral autocracy’, where popular ‘consent’ is expressed through plebiscites and/or 
an electoral process that is hardly free and fair (‘rigged election autocracy’) or is 
incapable of disturbing the top power-holders even though the procedures on election 
day might pass certain international tests, is another and well populated category. As 
has been argued in the case of Jordan for example, even a non-fraudulent electoral 
process that is incapable of producing alternation in the real seat of executive power 
can serve to lend support to a regime.7 It can be meaningful in terms of buttressing 
regime claims to legitimacy.  Finally in terms of domestic sources there is 
‘performance legitimacy’ – meeting or presiding over fulfilment of societal needs and 
desires such as material welfare and personal security. This can count for a lot, 
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whether achieved through ensuring an increasing supply of ‘standard public goods’ to 
society (as in East Asia’s authoritarian model of development) or by dispensing 
patronage more discriminatingly through patron-client networks, as in many African 
countries.  Perceptions of ‘performance’ of course may differ among different social 
groups, and their individual judgments will correspond to how well they fare. Even 
so, the beneficiaries may be so well-placed, or the ‘winning coalition’ is sufficiently 
large, to ensure regime stability without the government having to resort to massive 
intimidation or extensive repression.8
For some regimes, international legal recognition and support whether 
material and/or symbolic - that is to say external legitimation – are very valuable to 
the manufacture of legitimacy at home.  Conversely, the portrayal of an ‘enemy at the 
gates’ and manipulation of the ‘other’ (as in the demonisation of US imperialism by 
the leaders of North Korea and Cuba, or of Israel and Zionism by Iran’s rulers) too 
can contribute a major source of domestic legitimacy. Naturally this and the other 
legitimating sources are not all mutually exclusive. In practice an autocracy is likely 
to derive its authority from more than one source. And just as the conviction may be 
spread unevenly across society, so a regime’s main claim to legitimacy can shift over 
time, adjusting to developments in society and changes in the international 
environment.  
Finally, today’s autocracies differ over when and how they came to be 
autocratic.  In China there is a distinct political tradition going back centuries, 
whereas in some of the other countries statehood has been enjoyed for less than 50 
years. Although such considerations might affect the possibilities for autocratic 
opening to democracy now, the ‘causes’ that illuminate an autocracy’s persistence 
will not necessarily coincide with the historical reasons explaining its origins, where 
subjugation and oppression at the hands of colonial masters and a legacy from 
botched preparations for self-rule may be part of the background (as in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance).  
The resilience shown by some autocracies over the last 20 years or so - a time 
when there has been considerable political flux else in the world - is noteworthy 
indeed, as is the durability of some autocratic leaders (Fidel Castro being an 
outstanding example, given the termination of Soviet patronage and constant US 
attempts to destabilise his rule). However, although persistence does not mean 
permanence, the club of autocracies has actually gained some new members as well as 
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lost some members, from time to time. To illustrate, compare the Freedom House 
survey for 2004 with its equivalent for 1992 when the tide of optimism in 
democracy’s ‘third wave’ was at its height (1992 saw the publication of Francis 
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man).  Freedom House identified 42 
‘not free’ states in 1992. By 2005 just eleven of them had ‘graduated’, although only 
one (Ghana) has since reached ‘free’ status (that is a combined score for political 
rights and civil liberties of five or lower). But, over the same period the number of 
‘not free’ states increased by eight, and acquired 20 newcomers in the process. 
Figures like these suggest that it is easier to become an autocracy than to make a 
sustained opening to liberal democracy.  Indeed, if as McFaul argues seven ‘necessary 
conditions’ or ‘critical factors’ are needed to explain the recent breakdown of the 
semi-autocracies in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine,9 then how much more challenging 
must be the task of transforming a full autocracy? Historically there are more 
examples of autocracy being replaced by a different kind of autocracy (for example 
military rule succeeding a personalist dictator) and of strong autocracy giving way to 
weak autocracy (as when ‘Baby Doc’ succeeded ‘Papa Doc’ in Haiti in 1971), than 
there are liberal democratic transformations. 
The conclusion that explaining the persistence of autocracy might have to be 
‘multi-causal’, with different explanations or varying combinations of explanations 
serving in different places and/or in the same place at different times, is lent support 
by the variety and plasticity of legitimating sources. Exactly the same finding could 
apply to explaining autocratic opening. And while autocratic variety might be 
considered problematic from the perspective of general theory-building aimed at 
making predictions, its advantage is that certain pathways to change that look 
unfeasible in some autocracies might be more viable in some others. Where diversity 
implies the need for more than one explanation, so there could be plural ways in 
which autocracies start to undergo change, especially with the ‘encouragement’ of 
international actors.  It is in these circumstances that the relevance of legitimacy 
comes to the fore, as will be argued after first commenting briefly on the idea of 
autocratic opening. 
 
Autocratic opening 
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Autocratic opening is no mere circulation of the autocrats, a change of faces at the 
top. To be meaningful it must mean regime change, and more.  Autocratic inclinations 
and institutions may not be the preserve of an inner circle, the political elite, but may 
also be found within society including among groups that would wish to dismantle 
and replace the existing autocratic regime.  Some of the Islamic militants who are 
seeking to overthrow the Saudi monarchy are an example.  So, while regime change 
can come about in several different ways, such as following a popular uprising from 
below or fragmentation and implosion from within, or through financial and economic 
collapse of the state and following external military intervention, all these cases beg 
the question ‘opening to what?’  In practice the sequel to autocratic openings has 
often been some modest measure of political liberalisation but nothing more 
significant than that.  Certain civil liberties are increased but with no intention to 
institutionalise the principle of uncertainty in answer to the question ‘who will 
govern?, which is requisite for liberal democracy.  Evidence from the Middle East in 
particular suggests that the conversion of a vulnerable autocracy into a semi-
authoritarian regime through a controlled process of political liberalisation can furnish 
something like a sustainable ‘equilibrium’ - although a moot point is how long that 
can continue where international pressure to accelerate change is intensified.  Even 
then the challenge might be to avoid what has been called ‘democratization 
backwards’, where elections are used to determine who governs and alternation 
becomes a real possibility but without substantial progress towards the rule of law and 
a situation where all individual/group liberties are firmly entrenched.  
Theories of path dependence tell us that previous regime characteristics and 
the manner of its opening will impact on what happens next. Certainly, the factors that 
produce autocratic opening may well not seal democratic transition and are unlikely to 
be sufficient to consolidate democracy or guarantee improvements in its quality 
thereafter. If autocratic opening occurs in a way that destroys the state, through 
bankruptcy or physical destruction (perhaps because the state was targeted as the 
route to making the regime vulnerable or the state was already very weak, or regime 
and state were so indistinguishable that opening the regime inevitably had dire 
consequences for the state), then the final outcome will be hard to predict.  The 
sequencing of developments can be critical.  For instance, without the existence-in-
waiting of something like political parties that can organise, channel, and control the 
expression of popular demands then the collapse of an ancien regime may give way to 
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disorder, which in turn allows elements hostile to democracy (‘uncivil’ social forces, 
or populist demagogues, and the like) to take control of events.10  Iraq at the present 
time looks like a strong candidate.  Moreover the outcome of attempted opening and 
its longer term survival will be contingent in part on the legitimacy that is garnered by 
the successor regime (whatever its type) and on how claims about legitimacy are 
affected by the manner of regime replacement, including the impact of international 
intervention (a complicating factor in Iraq especially). 
 
Legitimacy matters 
 
‘Opening sustained’ is preferable to ‘opening lost’ but what can make it happen?  A 
fairly safe generalisation is that the importance of agency has gained increasing 
recognition in studies of democratic ‘transition’, and that the significance of structural 
conditions to sustaining democratisation in the longer term, especially socio-economic 
conditions, retains strong credibility too.  At all times structural features - themselves 
in part the product of agency - will influence contingent choice to some degree. 
Further to that generalisation, distinctions which offer useful analytical purchase 
include those between conditions that make opening possible (‘facilitating 
conditions’) and conditions that predispose or make it more likely to happen 
(‘promotional conditions’). The distinctions between conditions/requisites and 
preconditions/prerequisites, between underlying conditions (or preconditions) and 
catalysts or ‘precipitating factors’ (‘proximate cause’, or ‘triggers’), as well as 
between necessary and sufficient conditions are also very familiar.  However, it is 
probably unavoidable that different theoretical persuasions will subsume the same 
pieces of evidence under different headings, with one ‘school’ or theoretical tendency, 
historical materialism for instance, labelling as a primary cause what another claims 
are merely predisposing conditions. However, any ahistorical or uniform theories of 
change would benefit from investigating whether the circumstances which merely 
predispose to autocratic opening in one country at a particular point in time could be 
more potent in some other countries. In fact a growing acknowledgment of the 
international dimensions of democratisation suggests that external judgments of 
regime legitimacy may now carry more weight than perhaps at any previous time, 
although external actors can probably play a more decisive role in transitional stages 
than the long haul afterwards - when a society’s firm commitment (or lack of) to 
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democratic values makes all the difference. But even then, external factors have the 
power to damage democratic prospects, for instance by frustrating economic 
development. Thus one possibility is that influencing factors, international or 
otherwise, may exert an asymmetrical influence: the greater potential of external 
actors to unmake than to create sustainable opening to democracy may be a leading 
example.  
One factor that much recent discourse has tended to overlook in all of this is 
the autocratic regimes’ claims to legitimacy. This bears witness to how far the idea 
that democracy is a universal value has become the conventional wisdom in the West. 
But the view that all right thinking people want to give it priority, with the only 
exceptions being megalomaniacs and their cynically self-interested acolytes is too 
simplistic. Moreover by failing to distinguish the different claims to legitimacy and 
their effectiveness among the autocracies, it fails to give sufficient weight to the 
different vulnerabilities (and differences in the extent of vulnerability) to which those 
claims can and sometimes do give rise. This is crucially important from the 
perspective of ‘contentious collective action’ directed at changing the regime from 
within society.11  For example whereas a ‘dear leader’s’ deep personal unpopularity 
or a time of leadership succession may both create a crisis for personalistic 
dictatorship these difficulties should be less evident for rule by a military junta or the 
hegemony of institutional one-party rule.  The tensions that can exist between a desire 
to rule and the commitment to professional military values which may sometimes 
cause even a military government to weaken, and the way that one-party rule in 
communist Central-Eastern Europe was hollowed out by mass indifference and 
defections among the public, do not refute the point. In contrast, electoral autocracies 
that have or are about to introduce elections may miscalculate the chances of an 
autocrat being able to retain power even in a ‘rigged’ ballot (of course the 
denouement may not come immediately in one single ‘electoral revolution’ but could 
take two or even three successive elections). This is especially so where the rigging is 
widely judged to be so extravagant and so blatant as to delegitimate the electoral 
outcome, the process and the regime (as in Georgia’s ‘rose revolution’, for example).  
Autocracies that survive largely on the basis of dispensing patronage, however, will 
be more than usually exposed to  a sudden dramatic shrinkage in the resources at their 
disposal, especially if it begins to hurt the autocrats’ ‘winning coalition’ – the social 
groups who have benefited the most and provide the main source of political support. 
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The different sources of legitimacy and their vulnerabilities are significant not 
just for what they might tell us about the exit routes from autocracy but because of the 
implications for how democracy promotion actors in the international community 
could seek to become involved. 
 
International ‘intervention’ 
 
International intervention of various sorts in the furtherance of both democracy and 
human rights has increased dramatically over the last fifteen years.  The stakeholders 
in this ‘industry’ include both governmental and inter-governmental actors and a host 
of (quasi-)non-governmental actors too, for instance the specially created democracy 
foundations, funded by governments (like Britain’s Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy), and the activities of Germany’s political foundations that are affiliated to 
that country’s political parties.12  For many of them the chances of influencing 
particular institutions, policies and specific behaviours to an extent that falls well 
short of autocratic opening have to be rated much more highly than securing 
autocratic opening. Conversely autocratic opening to democracy need not mean the 
abandonment of all the institutions, policies and behaviours that key actors in the 
international community find objectionable or believe pose some threat to their vital 
interests. Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections held in January 
2006 illustrates the point.  It may even exacerbate or introduce some new problems, 
like the difficulty of persuading electorates to make economic sacrifices in the 
interests of tackling global climate change, when an autocratic government could act 
more decisively.  Not all the factors primarily responsible for producing autocracy 
may be amenable to external influence of any sort. At minimum, rapid results should 
not be expected from international intervention – a point made by Levitsky and Way 
in respect of international ‘linkage’, which unlike ‘leverage’ is a source of ‘soft 
power’ that derives from economic, social, cultural as well as general political ‘ties to 
the West’.13
The possibilities for international intervention which span the range from hard 
power (highly coercive), through ‘diplomatic pressure’, to soft power, or forms of 
persuasion and the provision of democracy assistance on a consensual basis means 
there are issues of strategy for international actors: what is an appropriate mix and is 
there a particular sequence in which the different approaches or instruments should be 
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employed in order to secure optimum effect?14  The enforcement of financial or 
economic sanctions and the withholding of aid or other sought-after privileges such as 
membership of a preferential trading bloc, owing to a failure to comply with 
democratic and human rights conditionalities, lie towards the hard power end of 
intervention. They are not wholly reliable, and ultimately they risk imposing double 
jeopardy on the hapless citizens without guaranteeing the regime will change 
(Zimbabwe and Myanmar are illustrative). But the ‘soft power’ alternatives are hardly 
feasible towards the most closed societies like North Korea. And Nye is surely correct 
to say that ‘soft power’ (the ability to get what you want through attraction, not 
coercion or payments) is a relatively unpromising instrument in regard to precisely 
those societies where power is most highly concentrated, and more viable (but hence 
not so easily justified) in open societies where power is already dispersed. The effects 
are diffuse and may take many years to materialise.15  But it is worth noting that if 
path dependence within the domestic course of regime transformation really does 
influence the eventual outcome, then the manner of international intervention can 
contribute a form of path dependence in its own right. For example some critics claim 
that the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime by military intervention has made 
the challenge of Iraqi democratization more difficult, even though such a challenge 
would have been unthinkable while Saddam remained in power.  It may have made 
democratization elsewhere in the region more problematic too. Countering that is 
evidence from some regions of a positive ‘neighbourhood effect’, for instance the 
travel of ‘democracy revolutions’ from Georgia to Kiev (December 2005) and 
Kyrgyzstan (2006). 
One of the more reflective attempts to get to grips with thinking strategically 
about democracy intervention is what might be called the nutcracker approach, 
although it was designed more for semi-authoritarian regimes than full-blown 
autocracies. It is grounded in the assumption that pro-democratic political change 
involves conflict (not necessarily violent conflict), as different groups engage in 
struggles for and over political power.  One side of the ‘nutcracker’ involves applying 
international pressure to the regime to open up political space in which domestic pro-
reform interests can advance their cause.  That these interests may be primarily 
interested in changing the regime so as to pursue their particularist economic and 
other interests more effectively, rather than valuing democracy for its own sake, is no 
automatic disqualification.  The second side of the ‘nutcracker’ combines external 
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pressure with practical assistance to those societal groups and associations who are 
judged to have the potential and willingness to put the regime under pressure from 
below, especially if given some external support (training plus organisational, 
material and financial help). The strategy does need closer specification if it is to 
become fully operational, and it begs certain questions over and above a simply 
tactical or technical nature. For the closer the intervention approximates to hard power 
and/or risks provoking violent conflict within the countries concerned, then the more 
it raises moral and legal questions over who in the international community has the 
right to behave in this way if the objective is simply one of securing the possibility of 
opening towards democracy.16  
While questions about the legitimacy of different modes of intervention should 
not be ignored, a different but perhaps complementary strategy to the ‘nutcracker’, 
one that offers a more discriminating and less uniform approach, would hone in on the 
issue of political legitimacy within the autocracies. Where the regimes’ domestic 
legitimacy can be eroded by taking advantage of one or more of the vulnerabilities 
that the different bases of legitimacy potentially leave exposed, then autocratic 
regimes could be pushed closer to the point where they either have to concede 
demands for reform or, alternatively resort to more extravagant use of force – which 
in turn may degrade any legitimacy that previously came from international or 
domestic sources.  ‘Soft autocrats’ and, in hard autocracies some elements in the 
machinery of repression may baulk at the use of ever greater force, especially if 
international actors threaten high costs through exercising leverage, or if the means to 
apply increasing force simply do not exist (however, international arms embargos 
rarely seem watertight).   It also reasonable to assume that ‘within-regime’ and/or 
intra-state splits that enable the formation of pro-reform coalitions/alliances cutting 
across elite level ‘softliners’ and mass society’s democracy activists will create 
stronger pressure for change than if only one of these two constituencies mobilises. A 
partial exception would be where just such an alliance drives elite level ‘hardliners’ to 
be even more obdurate, because they fear the consequences of making concessions 
even more than if negotiations over political reform could have been contained within 
the elite level alone. 
 
Legitimacy and intervention 
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At first sight the domestic sources of autocratic legitimacy that appear to draw heavily 
on international legal recognition and external signs of support appear most 
vulnerable. After all, both the withdrawal of unconditional political and military 
support by the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and the waning confidence shown in 
communism are generally reckoned to have seriously undermined the communist 
party regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. It was the beginning of the end for 
them. However, some of today’s surviving autocracies seem well able to contain the 
domestic reputational consequences of international moral and political censure, and 
the West does not have complete freedom to withdraw all forms of external 
legitimation, anyway. For instance it is not easy to deny a government its country’s 
seat in the United Nations General Assembly.  In 2003 the US was unable to prevent 
Libya’s election as chair of the UN Human Rights Commission: only three states out 
of 53 members voted against.  Of course some autocracies enjoy practical support 
from and seek to draw legitimacy from the presence of other autocracies. This too 
makes it more difficult for democratisation’s international supporters to undermine 
some regimes when they are reluctant or unable to ‘pick off’ their main international 
‘friend ‘, China in particular.  Moreover, prominent actors in the West such as the 
foreign affairs, defence, and trade and industry departments of major states at times 
have reasons of their own for not wanting to destabilise one or another autocratic 
government.  But where an autocracy can bolster its legitimacy at home by feeding 
domestic hostility to western intervention (including for instance democracy 
promotion efforts) then again the challenge for outsiders is anything but 
straightforward. Similarly where autocratic rule is underpinned by society’s 
acceptance of the principle of hereditary rule, or by religious convictions and even 
more so if external pressure to democratise is seen as yet one more unacceptable 
example of cultural imperialism, then the regime’s basis in legitimacy indicates no 
obvious grounds for leverage by international democracy promotion actors. 
‘Electoral autocracies’ by comparison look like clear-cut candidates for 
sustained international efforts to improve the quality of the electoral process 
specifically. Moreover this approach to weakening the legitimacy an autocracy 
derives from holding elections should be positive also for sustainable democracy later, 
unlike for instance approaches that rely on eroding a regime’s performance legitimacy 
by the use of sanctions that damage the country’s economy.17  Of course that alone 
might not bring about alternation in office, and even if it does, the regime might 
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remain the same. In contrast autocracies that draw heavily on performance legitimacy 
seem exceptionally vulnerable to whatever reduces their ability to meet people’s 
needs, wants, and expectations. Perhaps more telling still , they are vulnerable to 
whatever causes society to believe that the regime cannot or soon will prove unable to 
meet people’s needs, wants, and aspirations such as in the event of a major 
‘exogenous shock’. These scenarios may not be of much concern to those autocracies 
that today are benefiting handsomely from globalising economic trends which lie 
outside the power of governments in the West to control. Thus for instance winners in 
the Gulf from recent dramatic hikes in the internationally traded price of oil and 
natural gas exemplify the political version of a ‘resource curse’. A more contentious 
example would be President Chávez’ Venezuela.  But the same situation need not 
apply to states whose governments are heavily underwritten by international aid. 
In oil-importing autocracies and especially the more aid-dependent, then, 
international actors do have the means to undermine regime legitimacy, by affecting 
economic performance through the application of economic sanctions, the 
enforcement of relevant political conditionalities and the like. But this can be done 
only at the price of making society incur some hardship in the meantime (i.e. ‘double 
jeopardy’).  Regime insiders who staff the instruments of repression will be the last to 
suffer. Calculating the inter-temporal and, possibly inter-generational distribution of 
costs and benefits to society from attempts to propel such a trajectory – one that 
travels from a spell of reduced performance (legitimacy) to autocratic opening - is 
extremely hazardous, not least because the crucial timings cannot be known in 
advance. Moreover no one can be absolutely certain that society will be ‘rewarded’ in 
the form of an improved regime ‘performance’ at the end. And it is not possible to 
objectively compare the estimated overall welfare consequences of gyrations in 
regime performance with the anticipated increase in freedoms that should accompany 
autocratic opening. The people’s own preference weightings on these matters cannot 
be established easily under autocracies, where the impartial design and execution of 
opinion surveys is not allowed.  Furthermore, ex ante and ex post judgments on these 
matters by the people may not coincide (successive polls of the Iraqi public asking 
whether life is better post-Saddam have produced varying results). Finally, weakening 
a country’s economy is no way to prepare it for opening to democracy, if 
modernisation theory’s claims that stable democracy has certain socio-economic 
requisites are at all valid (it is too soon to tell whether Indonesia, where externally-
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driven financial crisis destroyed the Suharto regime in the late 1990s, offers contrary 
evidence). 
An alternative scenario then, where society may not have to suffer absolute 
welfare losses in the meantime, would entail growing dissatisfaction with an 
autocratic regime’s performance (or expected future performance) owing primarily to 
an increase in society’s wants, felt needs, expectations and/or aspirations.  In all but 
the most closed societies there is some scope for international contact to bring such a 
situation closer. Through the international demonstration effect of conspicuous 
consumption in the West greater ‘linkage’ can help convert inadequate regime 
performance into local dissatisfaction and political opposition.  Practical external 
support for measures that raise the levels of education might help in this regard too. 
Where gross corruption, cronyism and/or mismanagement of scarce national and 
public resources are features of the autocratic rule, then any increase in public sector 
transparency which publicises the opportunity costs imposed on society will offer 
further possibilities. In this way the international financial institutions’ efforts to 
promote better ‘governance’ can contribute to eroding autocratic regime legitimacy, 
even though they cannot guarantee wide publicity for their findings throughout the 
society (autocracies usually control and censor public communications). This in turn 
draws attention to the role of the media. Assistance to the development of 
independent, professionally-run radio and newspapers offers a further ‘line of attack’ 
even if the operators have to be stationed outside the country’s borders, so long as the 
activity is not confused with more traditional propaganda activities geared to national 
interests. This seemed to be very effective in Serbia in the final months of Milošević’s 
presidency, for instance.18
Of course a weakening of the hold exercised by a regime’s legitimacy need 
not involve actual material reductions in societal well-being if society, or, perhaps just 
key members of the regime’s ‘winning coalition’ can be persuaded that their 
(increasing) material wants, needs, and expectations/aspirations are more likely to be 
met (or, even, surpassed) in the event of autocratic opening.  Raising expectations in 
that regard goes beyond merely dissatisfaction with the status quo, and it could add 
extra impetus to the domestic struggle anticipated by the ‘nutcracker’ approach. It 
might be every bit as important as a way of supporting struggle as is Palmer’s 
emphasis on raising the activists’ expectations about their capacity to secure political 
change.19  International actors may be complicit in getting the message across by 
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voicing criticism of a regime’s performance and more substantively by publicising 
that the country would be rewarded with offers of development aid, admission to 
preferential trading arrangements and so on if - but only if – the regime reforms.  Of 
course the logic of economic market forces may add its own impetus, independently: 
market actors strive to increase the people’s wants, felt needs and aspirations for 
purpose of making profitable gain.  Indeed, one argument is that autocrats’ resistance 
to political reform might be overcome by pushing economic liberalisation in a 
direction that ‘feather beds’ them – they trade political power for secure economic 
gain - although such an outcome could easily defeat the purpose of democratisation, 
and may look attractive only to some types of autocracy (not hereditary monarchies, 
for example).  And even if economic liberalisation and the operations of the market 
do challenge the economic power formerly wielded by the state there is no certainty 
that the legitimacy an autocratic regime enjoys will be destroyed, especially if the 
government can capture credit for the improvements in living standards. The point is 
amplified where society prioritises material gains over freedom - a modern version of 
the old Roman Republic’s tale of ‘bread and circuses’ (latte coffee and DVDs, 
perhaps?). That said, identifying economically rational economic policy/institutional 
reforms that will impact adversely on an autocratic regime’s key supporters while 
leaving much of society unharmed, and then working out how to persuade the 
government to initiate these reforms, is a strategy that offers interesting possibilities 
for international intervention.  Its implementation need not compromise the principal 
international financial institutions’ constitutional constraints on pursuing political 
ends, so long as the arguments that stress the potential economic gains from this 
course of action look plausible. 
Where, in contrast, the performance legitimacy of an autocracy rests on its 
claimed ability to secure order and stability in society rather than prosperity, much 
could depend on society’s willingness to believe that neither the process of autocratic 
opening nor the political situation that would be most likely to succeed it (weak 
government, for example) will jeopardise these valuable properties. The degree to 
which there really is a widespread ‘fear of freedom’ (or in the case of vulnerable 
minorities, fears about increased scope for injurious discrimination following a 
movement towards majoritarian democracy) will depend in part on whether the 
society is reasonably homogenous. The past record and historical memory of civil 
peace or sub-state violence will be influential too. The degree of empathy with other 
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societies where autocratic opening has brought chaos or violent disorder could also be 
important. Thus it is unsurprising that China should draw lessons of caution from the 
political changes that brought the internal collapse of the Soviet Union; similarly, 
peoples in the Middle East today may look at Iraq and fear the consequences of 
pushing for significant political change at home.  For the most part these are 
considerations that are not open to manipulation by international democracy 
promoters, although where a military (-backed) government has been defeated in war 
that can undermine its claims to be essential to domestic order (as Argentina’s junta 
discovered following the war in the South Atlantic). But perhaps the most that 
democracy promotion actors can do is try to combat the belief that authoritarian rule 
is necessary for development either directly or through presiding over stability, 
although here the signals sent out by scholarly investigations in the West continue to 
be mixed.20 Initiatives in international development co-operation that really do 
enhance the performance of developing world democracies in furthering the well-
being of the majority of their own citizens furnish a better advertisement for the 
merits of democracy than where trends in economic globalisation retard or undermine 
those democracies’ record of development and human security in the larger sense. 
Finally, there is the approach to promoting democracy that stresses its intrinsic 
worth as a system of values and beliefs that emphasises equal human rights, and is 
superior to all other political credos.  An implicit premise in the arguments for 
spreading democracy by way of socialisation, acculturation and education – more akin 
to ‘soft power’ than harder power interventions like political conditionality - is that 
democracy’s normative appeal can possibly trump the instrumental advantages or 
disadvantages it might be thought to have. The triumph of democratic ideals over 
communism in much of the former Soviet empire might be thought to lend support to 
this belief, especially in the 1990s during and after the political upheavals when living 
standards in the transition economies began to plummet.  Where the main ideological 
rival is ethnic nationalism the contest may not be so easy. Most importantly in the 
Middle East and other countries with substantial Islamic communities, is the 
challenge of persuading society to believe that liberal democracy need not threaten 
fundamental religious beliefs and practices, regarding the status and role of women 
for instance. 
International endeavours to combat autocratic legitimacy by disseminating 
liberal democratic norms and through socialisation are of course not incompatible 
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with efforts to apply the ‘nutcracker’ approach, although they do draw on very 
different models of politics. The second seeks to mobilise groups in struggle and 
sharpen the conflicts of interest, in short, it sees politics as action; the first places 
emphasis on changing the political culture and fashioning a new consensus, in other 
words, politics as talk.  But the latter has an advantage wherever the ‘nutcracker’ finds 
itself working with domestic political activists who have no great ideological 
commitment to democracy and are motivated more by a calculus of self-serving and 
short term gain or harbour sinister political intentions.  But of course there are some 
obvious caveats too. Apart from the practical problem of gaining access to society in 
the first place, does it really matter what the people think where the regime is 
prepared to respond to shifts in public opinion by increasing the repression? What do 
the democracy promoters do next if substantial numbers of people remain suspicious 
about the West - or more specifically about its ideas of freedom and democracy?  And 
‘Do not democratic principles imply that  a community may, through a  majority 
decision somehow manifested, delegate political decision-making to an authoritarian 
government in perpetuity, conditional on that government’s fulfilment of the purposes 
for which the delegation was made, for instance national unity, political stability, 
decisive government or long term planning. Any answer but yes violates the very 
equality of respect that democratic principles require us to accord members of 
different societies with different values, goals and traditions’.21 The absence of a 
democratic culture among the mass of society might not prevent autocratic opening by 
a regime, but it would certainly obstruct democratisation’s progress further on.  
Similarly the complete absence of true democratic convictions among the political 
elite need not mean there is no hope of autocratic opening: ‘nondemocratic actors, 
with nowhere else to turn, may seek negotiated, second-best solutions to contingent 
dilemmas that thrust them unwittingly on the path to democratic practice’.22  But an 
absence of liberal democratic convictions among both elite and mass looks very 
unpromising indeed, even if outside actors do tilt the incentive structure in favour of 
making some limited opening. Readers are invited to make their own estimates of 
which and how many countries fit this category.  
The United Nations currently has no legal right to use force to impose 
democracy, even if it were logically and practically possible for democracy to be 
imposed.  But in what could look like another example of double jeopardy, the 
citizens of longstanding autocracies do seem to be placed at a disadvantage compared 
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to societies where autocracy has been only recently reinstalled following  a 
democratic interlude, if there really is a ‘new implicit norm: once the people of a state 
have chosen a democratic form of government , it becomes both a right and a duty of 
the international community to protect the will and sovereignty of those people 
against unconstitutional interruptions of democracy by internal actors.’23  But not 
only does the UN lack much coercive power but the likelihood of military 
intervention by US-led forces for the purpose of bringing democracy should not be 
overestimated, given the growing burden of imperial overstretch and the salutary 
lessons to be gleaned from foreign occupation of Iraq. Where punitive sanctions are 
threatened or invoked, the main objective may not actually be democratisation but 
some other purpose, as in for example trying to dissuade the Iranian government from 
developing a military nuclear capability or from extending its political influence too 
deeply into southern Iraq. Yet in situations where a persistent gross abuse of human 
rights provokes sufficient international outrage or the UN Security Council declares 
that a regime threatens other countries’ security, then the possibility remains that 
military intervention would gain the kind of legitimacy that even the most benign 
autocracies may never possess at home.  
In the end that might not be necessary, however.  For even where an autocracy 
has virtually no legitimacy and is maintained largely by force and fear, society’s 
potential to make a difference through non-violent resistance and protest should not 
be underestimated either.24  In these circumstances the extension of non-violent 
support by the international community to non-violent strategies of opposition to 
autocracy within a country are harder to label as illegitimate manifestations of a new 
imperialism. At least the autocracy’s claims to legitimacy might be revealed for what 
they really are - threadbare - where not only does domestic opposition to the regime 
exist but the only way the regime feels able to respond is by increase of repression. 
And in some cases sound legal pretext may exist to at least bring autocratic (former) 
leaders to account under international conventions such as those that outlaw war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or more specific crimes such as torture, if the state is 
signature to some relevant international treaty.  
 
Conclusion 
 
That autocracies or hard authoritarian regimes vary in how they go about ‘systems 
maintenance’ is a fact that extends to the legitmating claims they employ - with 
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varying degrees of success - so as to avoid undue reliance on physical repression. 
Because these different claims are not all vulnerable in the same degree or in similar 
ways, actors in the international community who see it as their role to promote 
autocratic opening to democracy are presented with choices over how to proceed. 
From among the several possible resources of power and influence they can call upon, 
some approaches or combinations of instruments will have potentially more relevance 
than others, depending on which autocracies are identified and their legitimating 
properties. For autocracies that dispense with all claims to authority the analysis 
presented here would appear to have no relevance, leaving hard power as the most 
obvious approach. But that certainly cannot guarantee opening to democracy and 
moreover except in special circumstances the use of force has legal and legitimacy 
problems of its own.  Where domestic claims to legitimacy furnish some support for a 
regime the democracy promotion actors outside would do well to take the distinctive 
claims and their vulnerabilities into account, when devising their strategies. Where a 
regime’s claims to legitimacy draw on different sources or the substance of their 
claims changes over time, then a combination of approaches would seem to be 
indicated, and some attention should be paid to the sequencing too. 
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